A challenge facing the literature of equilibrium indeterminacy and sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations based on increasing returns to scale in production is that the required degree of increasing returns for generating indeterminacy can be implausibly large and rise quickly with the relative risk aversion in labor. We show that unsynchronized wage adjustment via a relative wage effect can both lower the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy to an empirically plausible level and make it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor. As a result, indeterminacy and sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations may emerge for empirically plausible increasing returns regardless of the value of the relative risk aversion in labor. The impulse responses of our model to demand shocks under indeterminacy are reasonable in terms of matching the business cycle, and sunspot shocks become more important due to the presence of labor market frictions.
INTRODUCTION
It has long been argued that economies of scale can be a potential source of sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1994) . In one-sector models with variable capacity utilization mild increasing returns to scale in production may generate an indeterminate equilibrium and sunspot-driven business cycles under the assumption of zero relative risk aversion in labor (e.g., Wen, 1998; Benhabib and Wen, 2004) ; but, even with a tiny relative risk aversion in labor the degree of increasing returns required for indeterminacy can be implausibly large, and it increases sharply with the relative risk aversion in labor. A similar problem also exists for twosector models (e.g., Benhabib and Farmer, 1996) . This poses a challenge to the plausibility of sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations based on increasing returns to scale in production.
One point of this paper is that unsynchronized wage adjustment via a relative wage effect can both lower the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy to an empirically plausible level and make it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor. As a consequence, an indeterminate equilibrium and thus sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations may emerge for empirically plausible increasing returns regardless of the value of the relative risk aversion in labor. We show that the impulse responses of the model to demand shocks under indeterminacy are reasonable in terms of matching the business cycle and sunspot shocks become more important due to the presence of labor market frictions.
In what follows, Section 2 sets up the model, Section 3 describes model calibration and reports our indeterminacy results, Section 4 provides some intuition for the results, Section 5 presents the model's general solution and impulse responses to fundamental shocks under determinacy and to both fundamental shocks and sunspot shocks under indeterminacy, and Section 6 contains a brief concluding remark. Some of the technical detail can be found in the three appendices.
A ONE-SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
We augment the Benhabib and Farmer's (1994) model of monopolistic competition in the goods market with variable capacity utilization in production, in the spirit of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) , Wen (1998) , and Benhabib and Wen (2004) , and money in the utility function as an asset to provide liquidity services. We model monopolistic competition in the labor market also, which allows us to study the effect of unsynchronized wage adjustment in a standard way.
The economy consists of a continuum of households that are endowed with differentiated labor skills indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], and that set nominal wages for their services in a staggered fashionà là Calvo (1983) with a hazard rate θ of unable to adjusting wages at each given date, and a continuum of firms that produce differentiated intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], and that set nominal prices for their goods in a synchronized fashion. 1 The production for each of the intermediate goods uses a composite labor n t = . The demand for an intermediate good j is given by y t (j) = [P t (j)/P t ] ε/(1−ε) y t , where the price P t for the final goods and the prices {P t (j)} j∈ [0, 1] for the intermediate goods are linked by P t = 1 0 P t (j) 1/(1−ε) dj
At any given date t, a household i seeks to maximize
where E t is the conditional expectations operator, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a subjective discount factor, c t (i) and M t (i) are consumption and nominal money balances, respectively, and χ ≥ 0 measures the relative risk aversion in labor, subject to
for s ≥ t, where k s (i) is capital, r s is real capital rental rate, f s (i) and τ s (i) are real profit and transfer from firms and the government, respectively, u s (i) ∈ (0, 1) is capacity utilization rate, and the capital depreciation rate is an increasing and convex function of the capacity utilization rate, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) , Wen (1998), and Wen (2004) . The household takes its initial capital and money holdings, and all rental rates and prices as given.
We assume that all households have identical initial endowments of capital and money stock.
We follow the literature on staggered wage-setting to assume that there are (implicit) financial arrangements that make the households able to insure against idiosyncratic income risks that may arise from the unsynchronized wage adjustment so that their equilibrium consumption, investment, and capital utilization rate are identical, although their nominal wages and hours worked may differ (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005) . The optimality conditions for utility maximization imply
, (1)
where (1) is the optimal wage-setting equation, (2) comes from optimal capacity utilization choice, and (3) and (4) arise from optimal decisions for consumption and for money and capital holdings.
At any given date t, an intermediate goods j is produced using capital and labor according to
where η > 1 measures the degree of increasing returns to scale at the individual firm level. It is worth noting that the profit maximization problem for each individual firm has an interior solution provided the degree of increasing returns to scale η is bounded above by the monopolistic markup ε. It can be shown that aggregate quantities are linked to real factor prices by
where w t is real wage rate for the composite labor,
, and aggregate production function has the reduced form y t = (u t k t ) α n 1−α t η , as in Benhabib and Farmer (1994) .
The government follows a constant money supply growth rule and injects newly created money into the economy via the lump-sum transfers to the households, (M t − M t−1 )/P t = 1 0 τ t (i)di. At any date t, total factor payments w t n t + r t u t k t and total monopolistic profits Π t exhaust the total value-added y t , and the market-clearing condition for the final goods gives rise to a resource constraint,
In what follows, we shall use m t , π p,t , and π w,t to denote real money balances, price inflation, and wage inflation, respectively.
It can be checked that there is a unique deterministic steady-state equilibrium for the economy.
For local determinacy analysis, we can therefore examine a log-linearized system of equilibrium conditions around the steady state. Throughout the rest of the paper, we shall use a variable with a hat to denote the percentage deviation of that variable in level from its steady-state value.
We start with the following system that governs the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics for consumption, capital, labor, real balances, price inflation, real wage, and wage inflation,
where
Once these variables are obtained, the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics for real capital rental rate and capacity utilization rate can be determined from the log-linearized versions of (2) and (4), and then the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics of real aggregate output can be determined from the log-linearized version of the aggregate production function. The local stability property of the model economy can thus be obtained by analyzing the system (5)-(11). Appendices A and B contain some detail of the analysis.
CALIBRATION AND INDETERMINACY RESULTS
A challenge facing the literature of equilibrium indeterminacy and sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations based on increasing returns to scale in production is that the required degree of increasing returns for generating indeterminacy can be implausibly large and rise quickly with the relative risk aversion in labor. One point of this paper is that unsynchronized wage adjustment can both lower the degree of increasing returns to scale required for indeterminacy to an empirically plausible level and make it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor.
Parameter Calibration
One period in our model corresponds to one quarter of a physical year. We set the quarterly discount factor ρ to 0.99, which is consistent with a steady-state annualized real interest rate of 4 percent. Given this value of ρ, while having in mind a steady-state annual capital depreciation rate of 10 percent, we calibrate the value of φ to 1.3885 to be consistent with a steady-state quarterly capital depreciation rate of 2.6 percent in the light of the steady-state equilibrium relationship
To consider a value for χ, the relative risk aversion in labor, we note that its inverse corresponds to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. A large number of empirical studies have estimated the labor supply elasticity. The evidence obtained based on different sources of data, frequencies of time, sample periods, aggregation levels, substitution margins (intensive versus extensive), seasonality adjustments, and estimation procedures suggests that the elasticity lies between 0.05 and 2. Many of these studies based on life-cycle data of hours worked (intensive margin) by men at annual or lower frequencies find an elasticity in the range of 0.05 to 0.3, as summarized by Pencavel (1986) .
Evidence on a low elasticity is also found by Altonji (1986) , Ball (1990), and Card (1994) . Using monthly data from the Denver Income Maintenance Experiment, MaCurdy (1983) finds that the (intensive) elasticity can be above 0.3 though it is below 0.7. Rupert, Rogerson, and Wright (2000) obtain similar estimates taking home production into account. Using tri-annual micro panel data of the Survey of Income and Program Participation, Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) estimate an hours worked elasticity (intensive margin) of 0.5 and an employment elasticity (extensive margin) of 1.5. Mulligan (1998) shows that the elasticity can lie in the 1-2 range. Many other of these studies, using multi-industry panel or macro-level data (as reported by Browning, Hansen, and Heckman, 1999) , using industry-specific data (e.g., Treble, 1986; Carrington, 1996; Oettinger, 1999) , and using data at several different frequencies (e.g., Abowd and Card, 1989) or taking into account seasonal variation in total hours worked (e.g., Barsky and Miron, 1989; Hall, 1999) , also provide corroborating evidence that helps reach a consensus that the elasticity lies between 0.05 and 2.
This suggests a value for χ between 0.5 and 20. As we will show below, our indeterminacy result is virtually invariant to the choice of χ within a broad range.
Turning to the elasticity of substitution between differentiated labor skills, we set ǫ to 4, which is the mid point of the empirical estimates by Griffin (1992 Griffin ( , 1996 that range from 2 to 6. Our results are not sensitive to alternative values of ǫ within this empirically plausible range.
To assign a value to the hazard rate of wage adjustment θ, we note that (1−θ) corresponds to the quarterly frequency of wage adjustment and the average duration of newly set wages for individual workers is given by 1/(1−θ). There is a large body of empirical work that has estimated the average length of wage setting interval, the frequency of wage adjustment, or the hazard rate. The evidence obtained based on different sources of data, sample periods, frequencies of time, aggregation levels, and estimation procedures reveals a relevant range for θ between 0.42 and 0.86. Many studies in the 1980s and the 1990s suggest an average length of wage setting interval of about four quarters or longer for the United States and other countries, such as Canada and Sweden, based on direct microeconomic evidence on wage setting procedures and indirect estimation from macroeconomic data. Taylor (1999) contains a comprehensive survey of this literature (see also Kahn, 1997) . This corresponds to a value for θ of at least 0.75. The more recent literature is also divided into two strands, one based on macro data and the other on micro data. The macro studies typically use SDGE models to estimate the hazard rate along with other structural parameters. While the estimation of θ by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) gives rise to a range for θ between 0.81 and 0.86. In light of the empirical evidence, we set the hazard rate of wage adjustment θ to 0.75 in the baseline model, as is standard in most theoretical studies of unsynchronized wage adjustment (e.g., Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000; Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez, 2005; Sveen and Weinke, 2007; Casares, 2010) . We will also show that our results are robust to alternative values of θ within its empirically plausible range.
We here recall that the profit maximization problem has a well-defined interior solution as long as the degree of increasing returns to scale η is bounded above by the monopolistic markup ε. In light of the studies by Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1986) , Shapiro (1987) , Basu (1996) , Rotemberg (1996) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) , Basu and Fernald (1994 , 1997 , 2002 , and Basu and Kimball (1997) , a value of ε between 1.05 and 1.15 can be empirically plausible.
This provides a useful criterion for assessing whether the required increasing returns to scale for generating indeterminacy is empirically reasonable. In searching for the values of η that produce indeterminacy, we set the two parameters η and ε equal so that profits for firms are zero. 3 With zero economic profit, the parameter α corresponds to the share of payments to capital in total value added in the National Income and Product Account. The implied value of α is about 0.3, in line with the value used in the standard business cycle literature.
Note that the two parameters ψ 1 and ψ 2 in the utility function do not affect the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics and thus we do not need to assign any particular values to them.
Unsynchronized Wage Adjustment Reduces the Required Degree of Increasing Returns for Indeterminacy
To appreciate the role of unsynchronized wage adjustment in reducing the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy, it is informative to contrast our results obtained under unsynchronized wage adjustment and under synchronized wage adjustment. Here it is useful to note that, with synchronized wage adjustment, that is, with θ = 0, the optimal wage-setting equation (1) and its log-linearized version (5) simplify to w t = ψ 2 ǫ(ǫ−1) −1 c t n
respectively, while all the other equilibrium conditions remain the same. This shows that our model featuring differentiated skills and monopolistic competition in the labor market with a zero hazard rate of wage adjustment is first-order equivalent to an otherwise identical model but with a homogenous skill and perfect competition in the labor market, which can be cast as an externality model such as Wen (1998) or Benhabib and Wen (2004) with money in the utility function. The comparison thus helps put into perspective our results in the light of the general literature on indeterminacy based on increasing returns to scale in production. The numbers presented in Table 2 also reveal that the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy can rise significantly with χ under synchronized wage adjustment while it seems invariant to χ under unsynchronized wage adjustment. We find that this is true in general.
To put this contrast into perspective, Figure 1 plots the minimal value of η that can generate indeterminacy for the case with synchronized wage adjustment and the case with unsynchronized wage adjustment for many more values of χ, ranging from 0 to 20. Again, all the other parameters take on their calibrated values reported in Table 1 . The broken line in the figure corresponds to the case with synchronized wage adjustment and, indeed, it increases rapidly with χ: it takes on a value of 1.1 when χ is set to 0, quickly rises to 1.2 as χ edges up to 0.1, and continues to increase with χ at a fast pace. The solid line corresponds to the case with unsynchronized wage adjustment and, in sharp contrast to the broken line, it stays flat at 1.1 regardless of the value of χ. 4
As a further robustness check, Figure 2 plots the minimal degree of increasing returns that can generate indeterminacy as a function of the relative risk aversion in labor under synchronized wage adjustment, as well as under unsynchronized wage adjustment with three alternative hazard rates, while all other parameters take on their calibrated values. 5 As can be seen from the figure, our 4 Notice that the two lines in Figure 1 intercept with the vertical axis at the same point. This is so since with zero relative risk aversion in labor, households would not mind varying their labor hours even with a tiny change in wages so equilibrium wages would not change much with employment even under synchronized wage adjustment, and the effect of unsynchronized wage adjustment is muted. We have obtained an analytical result which shows that the local stability condition is the same under synchronized wage adjustment and under unsynchronized wage adjustment if χ is set to 0. This result is available upon request from the authors.
5 In our quarterly model, the benchmark calibration of the hazard rate of wage adjustment, θ = 0.75, implies that wages are adjusted once every four quarters on average, and a value of θ equal to 0.50 implies that wages are adjusted every other quarter on average, while as a value of θ equal to 0 implies that wages are adjusted every quarter, corresponding to the case with synchronized (and flexible) wage adjustment. While the result under θ = 0.42 (the lower bound on the empirical estimates of the hazard rate of wage adjustment) is very similar to that under θ = 0.50 (the broken line with dots in Figure 2 ), the result under θ = 0.86 (the upper bound on the empirical estimates of the hazard rate of wage adjustment) is very similar to that under θ = 0.80 (the broken line in Figure 2 ). results are robust to alternative values for the hazard rate of wage adjustment within its empirically plausible range.
Putting the above results together we conclude that, not only does unsynchronized wage adjustment lower the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy to an empirically plausible level, it also makes it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor. As a consequence, an indeterminate equilibrium and thus sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations may emerge for empirically plausible increasing returns regardless of the value of the relative risk aversion in labor.
SOME INTUITION
To understand why unsynchronized wage adjustment makes the required increasing returns to scale for indeterminacy smaller and its sensitivity to the relative risk aversion in labor disappear, we first note that the only difference between the case with synchronized wage adjustment and the case with unsynchronized wage adjustment lies in the left hands side of (5): it is zero under synchronized wage adjustment but generally nonzero under unsynchronized wage adjustment. We next recall that increasing returns to scale in production makes indeterminacy more likely to occur because it makes the optimal response of labor to a contemplated increase in capital stronger, resulting in a smaller decrease or even increase in the marginal product of capital and thus the contemplated increase in capital is more likely to be self-fulfilling. That said, with synchronized wage adjustment, a large χ serves as a counter-force to dampen the response of labor, as a large relative risk aversion in labor makes it more costly to raise labor hours under synchronized and hence flexible wage adjustment. This can be seen by imposing θ = 0 in (5): the response of n t to a contemplated increase in k t+1 (note that k t is predetermined) is then given by k c /(1 + χ), which clearly decreases with χ. Thus, a large relative risk aversion in labor requires a large degree of increasing returns to start with in order to generate indeterminacy. In fact, we obtain a necessary condition for indeterminacy under synchronized wage adjustment as
which puts a lower bound on the required degree of increasing returns and the lower bound increases with χ, manifesting our results in Section 3 for the case with synchronized wage adjustment.
Unsynchronized wage adjustment effectively dampens the cost of raising labor hours and relieves the counter-force brought about by the relative risk aversion in labor. With unsynchronized wage adjustment, firms can optimally increase employment in response to a contemplated increase in capital without equilibrium wages rising as they would with synchronized wage adjustment. The fact that labor can be more elastic to capital if θ > 0 can be seen from (5): a change on the right hand side due to a large response of labor to capital can be well matched by a change on the left hand side now. To understand why χ multiplied by ǫ enters the left hand side of (5) we note that, with unsynchronized wage adjustment, even households that can adjust their wages will choose not to increase their wages much, as firms can substitute away from their more expensive labor services and toward the cheaper ones provided by other households that can't change their wages. The strength of this deterrence depends on how easy it is to substitute across the differentiated labor skills, as measured by ǫ, and on how fast marginal dis-utility of working changes as hours worked fall, as determined by χ. This substitution across differentiated labor skills following a relative wage change results in a small overall wage increase and a large overall employment response to the contemplated increase in capital. With labor being more elastic to capital, the marginal product of capital does not decrease as fast or even increases with capital and a self-fulfilling equilibrium is more likely to occur. The presence of χ on the left hand side of the equation via a positive θ essentially cancels out its effect on the right hand side, making the required increasing returns to scale for indeterminacy invariant to χ.
To drive home our intuition in a more rigorous way, we can use (6) and (8)- (11) to solve for the wage inflation rates on the left hand side of (5) in terms of labor and capital. We consider
, and impose perfect foresight to simplify exposition. We note that φ so set is greater than ρ −1 and the implied steady-state capital depreciation rate is strictly between 0 and 1 for any value of η in the above range; and as η varies across this range, φ varies from arbitrarily close to ρ −1 to arbitrarily close to infinity. We also note that the lower end of this range for η is close to 1 for a value of ρ close to 1. 6 With some algebra, we obtain the following simplified version of (5):
and q t−1 is predetermined and is given by
Equation (12) helps make our intuition more transparent. Since k w increases with η and ρ < 1, unsynchronized wage adjustment makes given existing returns more effective in generating an elastic response of labor to a contemplated increase in capital, as a change on the right hand side of (12) can be matched by a change on the left hand side due to a large increase in labor, and the response is no longer sensitive to χ, as its effects on both sides of the equation are essentially canceled out.
COMPUTING SUNSPOTS EQUILIBRIA
To gain further insight into the dynamic properties of the model, we study the model's general solution and impulse responses to various shocks. We consider two fundamental shocks as in Benhabib and Wen (2004) , a preference shock and a government spending shock. As in Wen (1998) and Benhabib and Wen (2004) , period utility derived from date-t consumption is now specified as log(c t − µ t ), where µ t is a shock to consumption that generates the urge to consume. We also consider as in Benhabib and Wen (2004) a shock to government spending, g t , representing a pure resource drain from the economy. The government budget constraint in period t is now specified as (M t − M t−1 )/P t = 1 0 τ t (i)di + g t , and the resource constraint for period t is now given by
We postulate stationary AR(1) log-normal processes for the fundamental shocks,
The log-linearized equilibrium system is then given by
and we have invoked the condition that E t k t+1 = k t+1 , since capital at date t + 1 is known at date where 
in which the last e ∈ [0, 16] equations are explosive and the first (16 − e) equations are stable. Since the rows of the e×4 matrix Q 2 Π are potentially linearly dependent, its singular value decomposition can generally be expressed as
where D 11 is an invertible, diagonal matrix, and U and V are orthonormal matrices.
When the degree of returns to scale is smaller than 1.1, we have e = s = 4, and the system has a unique equilibrium in which the expectations errors η t are uniquely determined by the fundamental shocks ε t ,
and the solution satisfies
Decompose
], the unique solution under determinacy is given by
where (Q 2 Π) + is the right-side pseudoinverse of Q 2 Π.
When the degree of returns to scale is greater than 1.1, we have e = s = 3, and the system has a one-dimensional indeterminacy so there is room for sunspots to affect the forecast errors η t and other endogenous variables. We consider here a one-dimensional reduced-form i.i.d. sunspot
Under indeterminacy, the forecast errors η t can be influenced by both the fundamental shocks ε t and the sunspot shock ζ t ,
and the full set of solutions is characterized by
where A is an arbitrary 1 × 2 matrix. Decompose
], the full set of solutions under indeterminacy is given by
To put into perspective our model's dynamics in the light of those obtained by Benhabib and Wen (2004) and Wen (1998) , we invoke the same values of parameters as in these papers when solving our model numerically, except for the two parameters pertaining to the labor market frictions, the elasticity of substitution of differentiated labor skills, ǫ, and the hazard rate of wage adjustment, θ, which are unique to our model, and which we set to 4 and 0.75, respectively, as reported in Table 1 . 8 This allows us to examine the effect of these labor market frictions on equilibrium dynamics when compared to Benhabib and Wen (2004) and Wen (1998) . Also, we choose the steady-state values of µ t and g t such that µ/c = 0.1 and g/y = 0.2 in the steady state, and we set ρ µ = ρ g = 0.9 and σ µ = σ g = σ ζ = 1, while innovations in fundamentals are assumed to be orthogonal to each other and to sunspots, as in Benhabib and Wen (2004) .
To illustrate the effect of indeterminacy on equilibrium dynamics, we present the impulse responses of the model to the fundamental shocks under determinacy, and to both the fundamental shocks and the sunspot shock under indeterminacy. Specifically, we examine two versions of our model, one with the degree of returns to scale equal to 1.1 (the case of determinacy), and the other with the degree of returns to scale equal to 1.11 (the case of indeterminacy), as in Benhabib and Wen (2004) and Wen (1998) . When considering the impulse responses to one type of shocks, we turn off the other type(s) of shocks by setting the corresponding variance(s) to zero. Also, when considering the impulse responses to a consumption shock, we set the steady-state government spending-to-output ratio g/y to zero; likewise, when considering the impulse responses to a government spending shock, we set the steady-state ratio µ/c to zero; and, when considering the impulse responses to a sunspot shock under indeterminacy, we set the two steady-state ratios g/y and µ/c both to zero. This is the same procedure followed by Benhabib and Wen (2004) ment spending shock. These responses are similar to those obtained in Benhabib and Wen (2004) under determinacy: both show positive comovements among output, consumption, investment, and hours worked, with the amplitude of response in investment bigger than those in output and hours worked, which are bigger than that in consumption, as seen from the data; but, output responses in both cases are monotone, as opposed to the hump-shaped initial output responses seen in the data (e.g., Wen, 1998) . The magnitudes of responses are greater here than in Benhabib and Wen (2004) , particularly for output, investment, and hours worked, manifesting the propagation mechanism embodied in the labor market frictions. Figure 4 plots the impulse responses of output, consumption, investment, and hours worked under indeterminacy (e.g., η = 1.11). The solid lines are responses to a positive one-standard-deviation consumption shock, the broken lines are responses to a positive one-standard-deviation government spending shock, and the broken lines with dots are responses to a one-standard-deviation sunspot shock that leads to an upward revision in forecast errors. 9 These responses are similar to those obtained in Benhabib and Wen (2004) under indeterminacy: in addition to quantity comovements and relative volatility, persistent cycles emerge following demand shocks (except for consumption's response to a consumption shock), including an i.i.d. sunspot shock, and initial output responses to serially correlated demand shocks are significantly hump-shaped. The magnitudes of responses to a sunspot shock are much greater here than in Benhabib and Wen (2004) , indicating that the labor market frictions hold a key for the significance of the model's response to sunspot shocks.
In sum, while the impulse responses of the model to demand shocks under indeterminacy are as reasonable as those in Benhabib and Wen (2004) in terms of matching the business cycle as shown
by Wen (1998) , sunspot shocks seem much more important here than in Benhabib and Wen (2004) due to the presence of labor market frictions.
CONCLUDING REMARK
We have studied the role of labor market frictions in the form of unsynchronized wage adjustment in inducing indeterminacy and sunspot-driven business cycles. Our finding is that unsynchronized wage adjustment both lowers the required degree of increasing returns for indeterminacy to an empirically plausible level and makes it invariant to the relative risk aversion in labor. In consequence, indeterminacy and sunspot-driven business cycle fluctuations can emerge for empirically plausible increasing returns regardless of the value of the relative risk aversion in labor. We have shown that indeterminacy holds the key for the propagation mechanism of the model. In particular, the model's impulse responses to demand shocks under indeterminacy are reasonable in terms of matching the business cycle, while sunspot shocks seem to become a more important source of business cycle fluctuations in the face of labor market frictions.
APPENDIX A: ANALYSIS WITH SYNCHRONIZED WAGE ADJUSTMENT
We show that the stability property of the system (5)-(11) for the case with synchronized wage adjustment can be obtained by analyzing a three-equation system. We first note that, with θ = 0, (5)- (8) constitute a self-closed system for consumption, capital, labor, and real balances. Once these variables are obtained, price inflation can be determined from (9), real wage from (10), and then wage inflation from (11). We next notice that (7) implies that (5) with θ = 0 can be rewritten
We can then use this relation to substitute out labor from (6) and (7), which together with (8) constitute a self-closed three-equation system in consumption, capital, and real balances,
Since this system contains one predetermined variable (capital) and two jump variables (consumption and real balances), indeterminacy requires at least two eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle.
APPENDIX B: ANALYSIS WITH UNSYNCHRONIZED WAGE ADJUSTMENT
We show that the stability property of the system (5)-(11) for the case with unsynchronized wage adjustment can be obtained by analyzing a six-equation system. We first use (7) to substitute out k t+1 from the right hand side of (5), we then use (10) to substitute out labor from (6) and (7), and we next use (9)-(11) to substitute out labor and wage inflation from (5). We arrive at the following system consisting of six equations,
where k t , s t , z t are predetermined variables, and c t , m t , and w t are jump variables, so indeterminacy requires at least four eigenvalues lying inside the unit circle.
APPENDIX C: COMPUTING SUNSPOTS EQUILIBRIA
The four matrices in Equation (25) are defined as follows: 
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